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Note
OVERBEY V. MAYOR OF BALTIMORE: THE COST OF SILENCE
AND THE IMPACT OF RESTRICTING SPEECH IN POLICE
BRUTALITY SETTLEMENTS
DELANEY E. ANDERSON*
Can the government purchase silence from a someone who its agents
beat, shocked with a stun gun, and ridiculed? 1 According to Supreme Court
precedent and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, no. 2
In Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 3 the Fourth Circuit answered the
important question of whether the government may impose content-specific
speech restrictions in the context of settlement agreements. 4 Implicit in the
court’s reasoning is the underlying goal of self-fulfillment in First
Amendment speech protections. 5 Through an analysis of First Amendment
precedent, the court accurately captured the importance of protecting speech
describing an individual’s personal experience of government abuse. 6
In Overbey, the court analyzed whether the use of a non-disparagement
clause, prohibiting Ashley Overbey from speaking about her experience of
police brutality, was an enforceable waiver of her First Amendment rights.7

© 2020 Delaney E. Anderson
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The
author wishes to thank Professor Leslie Meltzer Henry for her invaluable guidance, as well as the
Maryland Law Review editors, particularly Bianca Spinosa and Hunter Haines, for their thoughtful
feedback and editing. The author also wishes to thank her family and mentors for fostering a love
of writing and providing unwavering support.
1. See Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930 F.3d 215, 220 (4th Cir. 2019) (presenting these
facts).
2. Id. at 226.
3. 930 F.3d 215, 220 (4th Cir. 2019).
4. See infra Section IV.A. A settlement agreement occurs when a defendant offers something
(usually monetary compensation) to a plaintiff so that the plaintiff “agrees not to disclose evidence
that could establish the [defendant’s] liability to others.” Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence:
Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 271 (1998). Ultimately, the
defendant “seeks to suppress information that could expose it to civil liability.” Id. A contentspecific speech restriction is when the government seeks to silence certain speech based on the
content expressed by the speech. See Rebecca A. Taylor, The First Amendment, AM. BAR ASS’N:
GPSOLO EREPORT, July 2014, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/publications/gpsolo_
ereport/2014/july_2014/the_first_amendment/.
5. See infra Section IV.C.
6. See infra Section IV.C.
7. Overbey, 930 F.3d at 221–22.
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In effect, the government sought to purchase silence to prevent critique from
reaching the public consciousness with “hush money.” 8 While an individual
may waive a constitutional right, that waiver is not enforceable unless strong
public policy interests support its enforcement. 9 The court correctly held that
the foundational public policy interests in open public debate and government
mistrust were superior to the government’s interest in efficiency and
minimizing critique. 10 The court’s reasoning was consistent with the
Supreme Court’s protective First Amendment jurisprudence, and the court,
by implication, affirmed the importance of protecting the speech of
marginalized individuals that is critical of the government, especially
experiences of police brutality. 11
Expanding on the court’s correct decision and the resulting implications,
this Note will analyze the case, the underlying precedent, the court’s
reasoning, and the court’s application of relevant precedent and First
Amendment theory. 12 Part I of this Note will describe the case before the
Fourth Circuit, including Overbey’s experience, Baltimore City’s response,
and the United States District Court for the District of Maryland’s decision. 13
Part II will then discuss the relevant legal precedent underlying the court’s
decision. 14 This Part will explore the First Amendment jurisprudence related
to content-specific speech restrictions on speech that is critical of the
government, the supremacy of First Amendment interests over competing
interests, and the free speech jurisprudence related to self-fulfillment and
self-respect. 15 Part III will follow the court’s reasoning that led to its
conclusion that the non-disparagement agreement was an unconstitutional
waiver of Overbey’s First Amendment right, as well as Judge Quattlebaum’s
dissenting opinion. 16 Finally, Part IV will explore the relationship between
the court’s decision and government-critical speech protections, the policies
underlying the First Amendment, and the freedom of speech of marginalized
communities. 17

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 226.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 224, 226.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Parts I–IV.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
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I. THE CASE
In April 2012, police officers from the Baltimore City Police
Department physically attacked, degraded, and arrested Ms. Ashley Overbey,
all because she called 911 fearing someone had burglarized her home. 18
Unfortunately, this fear was not assuaged by police presence. 19 Instead of
the protection Overbey anticipated, the police physically assaulted and
arrested Overbey. 20 Overbey sued the City to recover for her mistreatment
and its impact on her livelihood. 21 As a result of her arrest, Overbey was
unable to find a job, pay her bills, or maintain housing for her and her
children. 22 In the interest of a prompt conclusion to this traumatic incident,
Overbey agreed to a settlement of $63,000 with a caveat in the form of a nondisparagement clause that prevented her from speaking about “‘any opinions,
facts or allegations in any way connected to’ her case.” 23 If Overbey
discussed her experience with Baltimore Police Department, she would be
required to remit half of her settlement back to the City. 24 The City, however,
remained free to speak about the case, Overbey, and her claims. 25
While the settlement was pending approval by the City, a news article
from The Baltimore Sun released information about the settlement and
Overbey. 26 The article quoted the City Solicitor describing Overbey as
“hostile” with police and suggesting that she caused her own mistreatment. 27
Internet commenters made many negative and disparaging comments on the
article about Overbey. 28 The internet commenters, following the City
Solicitor’s sentiment and utilizing racist rhetoric, accused Overbey of
18. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930 F.3d 215 (4th Cir. 2019) (No.
17-2444).
19. Id.
20. Overbey, 930 F.3d at 220.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. The settlement agreement included Overbey, the three officers who physically
assaulted and arrested her, and the City. Id. The City’s use of non-disparagement clauses in police
misconduct settlements required claimants “promise not to speak to the media about either their
underlying allegations or the settlement process” and were included in ninety-five percent of the
City’s police misconduct settlement agreements. Id. at 219–20.
24. Id. at 220.
25. Id.
26. Id.; see Luke Broadwater, City to Pay $63K to Woman Police Shocked with Taser, BALT.
SUN (Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-xpm-2014-09-15-bal-city-topay-63k-to-woman-police-shocked-with-taser-20140909-story.html. This article has been edited
since its original posting and all comments have been turned off. Id.
27. Overbey, 930 F.3d at 220; see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 8 (“Accompanying the
information about her settlement was an explanatory statement by the City Solicitor that, in
substance, pinned blame for Ms. Overbey’s altercation with the police on Ms. Overbey herself,
characterizing her disposition as ‘hostile’ to the responding police officers.”).
28. Overbey, 930 F.3d at 220.
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instigating the altercation to gain a settlement from the police. 29 Overbey
responded to some comments to defend herself and explained how the police
harmed her. 30 The City then provided Overbey with only half of her
settlement, withholding the other half as “liquidated damages” for her
violation of the settlement agreement’s non-disparagement provision. 31 In
response to this penalization, Overbey filed another action arguing that the
non-disparagement clause violated her First Amendment right to free
speech. 32 The City moved to dismiss the charges, or alternatively sought
summary judgment. 33 Despite not having completed any discovery, the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted the City’s
motion for summary judgment. 34 The district court upheld the nondisparagement clause, reasoning that Overbey entered into the settlement
voluntarily and that the agreement was not contrary to public policy. 35 On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the order to resolve whether the nondisparagement clause violated Overbey’s First Amendment rights and was
therefore void. 36

29. Id. (“The Sun’s story accumulated several anonymous, race-inflected comments implying
that Overbey had initiated a confrontation with the police in hopes of getting a payout from the
City.”). Examples of the language used by commenters include: “[Y]ou never touch a police
officer . . . I would rather be shot by a Taser, then [sic] a bullet. I can”t [sic] wait until you need
their help in the future. Enjoy the money!!” and “So, OK, I can call the cops, assault one of them,
get tased and get paid! Sounds like a plan!” Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 9–10.
30. Overbey, 930 F.3d at 220. Examples of Overbey’s comments responses include:
I am the woman who this article is talking about AND THE POLICE WERE WRONG!!
This article doesn’t come close to WHAT REALLY HAPPENED or tell how three men
over 200 lbs each beat me (115 lbs) bruises all over my body a black eye AND tased
twice all in front my 2 yr old daughter so before you decide to put ur [sic]
MEANINGLESS opinion in on something FIND OUT THE FACTS FIRST! IF I were
wrong my charges wldntve [sic] ben [sic] thrown out and i wldntve [sic] received a dime.
and
AND THIS WAS ALL AFTER I CALLED THEM FOR HELP AFTER MY HOME
HAD BEEN BURGULARIZED WHILE I WAS AT WORK!! SO ANYONE WHO
HAS ANYTHING TO SAY (NEGATIVITY) YOU CAN TAKE UR [sic] OPINION
AND SHOVE IT!!
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, 9–10.
31. Overbey, 930 F.3d at 220. The City claimed that the liquidated damages provision allowed
the City to withhold half of Overbey’s settlement amount due to her violation of the nondisparagement clause and the City’s supposed injury by Overbey’s conduct. Id.
32. Id. at 221. The Baltimore Brew, a local news organization that investigates police
misconduct, joined Overbey’s suit and argued that the non-disparagement clause similarly violated
the news organization’s First Amendment “interest in newsgathering.” Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. The district court also granted the City’s motion for summary judgment against the
Brew by concluding that the Brew lacked standing. Id.
36. Id. The Fourth Circuit also resolved whether the Brew had standing in order to bring a
claim against the City and the Baltimore City Police Department. Id. at 230.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The First Amendment guarantee of free speech reads simply, “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” 37 Since the adoption
of the Bill of Rights, the Court has sought to interpret how far that freedom
of speech extends. 38 The Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence reveals a
strong commitment to uninhibited speech, especially when that speech is
used by individuals to critique the government. 39 In reviewing the relevant
jurisprudence underlying the Fourth Circuit’s decision and its implications,
Section II.A reviews the Court’s approach of content-specific speech
restrictions, including speech that is critical of the government. 40 Section
II.B then examines the superiority of the First Amendment right over
competing interests. 41 Section II.C finally explores the Court’s discussion of
the overlap between First Amendment freedom of speech and its relation to
individual autonomy. 42
A. First Amendment and Content-Specific Speech Restrictions
Since the 1960s, the Court has repeatedly struck down content-specific
speech protections in favor of a jurisprudence that is protective of the
freedom of speech. 43 A unanimous Court in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan 44 announced the modern day First Amendment jurisprudence around
content-specific speech restrictions. 45 Content-specific speech restrictions
refer to state-imposed restrictions that prohibit speech based on the subject
that the speech addresses. 46 The Court articulated a strong basis for the
37. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment right to freedom of speech was incorporated
against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“[F]reedom of speech . . . [is] among the fundamental personal
rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from
impairment of the States.”).
38. See infra Sections II.A–C.
39. See infra Sections II.A–C.
40. See infra Section II.A.
41. See infra Section II.B.
42. See infra Section II.C.
43. See infra notes 44–63 and accompanying text.
44. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
45. See id. at 270. The Court’s approach to the First Amendment became increasingly
protective of free speech following New York Times Co. Compare id. (noting that the Court
considered the case in light of a “profound national commitment” to public debate that may include
“vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials”),
with Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 623 (1919) (holding that the use of “disloyal and
abusive language” about the government during war was properly silenced by government because
the purpose was to “excite” and “embarrass[]” the military overseas).
46. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380–82 (1992) (holding that an ordinance
that prohibited cross burning specifically rooted in causing anger based on certain characteristics
was invalid because “[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid”).
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importance of First Amendment protections when balanced against
government-critical speech. 47 In New York Times Co., the Court evaluated
the constitutionality of a state law on libel actions brought by public officials
and established a required showing of “actual malice.” 48 The libel action
related to a newspaper advertisement that detailed efforts in the Civil Rights
Movement and the police response to stifle the movement with “intimidation
and violence.” 49 The Court described the important interest underlying
freedom of speech and the First Amendment, stating “we consider this case
against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials.” 50 The unanimous decision
in New York Times Co. established that First Amendment speech rights are
subject to significantly high protection in the interest of the “interchange of
ideas.” 51
Soon after New York Times Co., the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio 52
again emphasized the importance of protecting content-specific speech by
setting out a narrow test for speech that is not protected. 53 In Brandenburg,
the Court stated that a constitutional right to free speech, “do[es] not permit
a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force . . . except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action.” 54 The Court showed the great
deference given to freedom of speech and the sharp limits of states that try to
curtail it. 55 The Court’s reasoning in both New York Times Co. and

47. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270.
48. Id. at 279–80 (“The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits
a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”).
49. Id. at 257–58.
50. Id. at 270. The Court more recently expressed its continued opinion that governmentcritical speech may not be prohibited by the government. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256
(2006) (“[T]he First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to
retaliatory actions . . . for speaking out . . . .”).
51. 376 U.S. at 269 (“The constitutional safeguard, we have said, ‘was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.’” (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))).
52. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
53. Id. at 447 (noting that the Court’s decisions stand for the principle that the government’s
ability to interfere with free speech is limited to very special circumstances).
54. Id. Brandenburg concerned a Ku Klux Klan rally where the speakers stated that if the
government did not address the “suppress[ion] of whites,” there would be a “possible . . .
revengeance.” Id. at 446. The rally was subsequently played on television because the organizers
invited a reporter to attend. Id. at 446–47.
55. Id. at 448.
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Brandenburg reveals its disapproval for state challenges to free speech at the
expense of open dialogue and debate. 56
Following this progression, the Court in Police Department of Chicago
v. Mosley 57 held that restricting peaceful picketing based on content violated
the First Amendment, noting that “above all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” 58 Similarly, in Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Board, 59 the
Court explored whether governments can impose financial burdens on
individuals based on the content of their speech. 60 The Court reasoned, “the
government’s ability to impose content-based burdens on speech raises the
specter that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints
from the marketplace.” 61 Applying strict scrutiny, the Court found that the
state did have a compelling interest but that its means of achieving that
compelling interest were not narrowly tailored. 62 The Court affirmed
limiting content-specific speech was “beyond the power of the government”
because the Constitution envisions a “political system” that rests upon
“individual dignity and choice” in “the arena of public discussion.” 63
More recent precedent also expanded on interests at issue in contentspecific speech restrictions. 64 In Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, 65 the Court stated that the First Amendment is premised on a
“mistrust of governmental power” and the dangers of content control. 66 In
its reasoning, the Court noted that regulating content leads to unacceptable
results, stating:
By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others, the
Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the right
to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for

56. See supra notes 44–55 and accompanying text.
57. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
58. Id. at 95, 97–98. The ordinance at issue limited peaceful picketing unrelated to picketing
schools involved in labor disputes. Id. at 93.
59. 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 116 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448–49 (1991)).
62. Id. at 120–21, 123. The New York law at issue was a Son of Sam law concerning publishing
books based on criminal acts that required “any entity contracting with an accused or convicted
person for a depiction of the crime to submit a copy of the contract to respondent New York State
Crime Victims Board . . . and to turn over any income under that contract to the Board.” Id. at 109.
63. Id. at 116 (citing Leathers, 499 U.S. at 448–49).
64. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
65. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). The Court addressed the constitutionality of a statute that prohibited
corporations from using funds to advocate for particularly political candidates. Id. The Court found
that the statute suppressed political speech and an “essential mechanism of democracy.” Id. at 339.
66. Id. at 340.
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the speaker’s voice. The Government may not by these means
deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine for itself
what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration.67
The Court affirmed that content restrictions that suppress political speech are
contrary to the functioning of a democracy. 68
B. First Amendment Superiority over Challenges
In addition to guarding against content-specific speech restrictions, the
Court also continues to find that the interests underlying freedom of speech
are superior to almost all other competing interests. 69 All content-specific
speech restrictions are subject to a strict scrutiny analysis. 70 Any contentbased restriction on speech by the state must “further[] a compelling [state]
interest” and be “narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” 71 Contentspecific speech restrictions are presumptively unconstitutional unless the
state meets this high burden, even when an individual choses to waive their
First Amendment right. 72
In light of this analysis, over time, the Court has prioritized the interests
underlying First Amendment rights over competing interests. 73 In 1919, the
Supreme Court decided Abrams v. United States 74 and concluded that the
Espionage Act of 1917 was constitutional. 75 However, since its Abrams
decision, the Court has repeatedly found that, when the freedom of speech
has been curtailed by a government entity, the interest in protecting the First
Amendment far outweighed any competing interest. 76 For instance, as
explained in the previous Section, the Court in New York Times Co. protected
67. Id. at 340–41.
68. Id. at 339.
69. See infra notes 70–101 and accompanying text.
70. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015) (noting that “[b]ecause the
Town’s Sign Code imposes content-based restrictions on speech, those provisions can stand only if
they survive strict scrutiny”).
71. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 (citation omitted).
72. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226.
73. See infra notes 76–94 and accompanying text.
74. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
75. Id. at 616–17. The Espionage Act sought to limit government critique during World War
I. Id. The charges brought against the petitioners were for “disloyal, scurrilous and abusive
language about the . . . Government of the United States,” “language ‘intended to bring the form of
Government of the United States into contempt, scorn, contumely, and disrepute,’” “language
‘intended to incite, provoke and encourage resistance to the United States in said war,’” and “that
the defendants conspired ‘when the United States was at war . . . unlawfully and willfully, by
utterance, writing, printing and publication, to urge, incite and advocate curtailment of production
of things and products . . . necessary and essential to the prosecution of the war.” Id. (quoting
Espionage Act of Congress (§ 3, Title I, of Act approved June 15, 1917, as amended May 16, 1918,
40 Stat. 553)).
76. See infra notes 77–94 and accompanying text.
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free speech over the state’s interest in preventing attacks on government
officials and damage to professional reputation. 77 Although not at issue in
New York Times Co., the Court also examined the history of the Sedition Act
of 1798 that penalized “malicious” speech about the government and noted
that “[a]lthough the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack
upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history.” 78 The Court
emphasized that the Sedition Act of 1798 surpassed the allowances under the
First Amendment in its restriction on speech. 79 This sentiment is echoed in
other sources throughout both the country’s and the Court’s history. 80
In Wooley v. Maynard, 81 the Court affirmed an individual’s right not to
speak or express the state’s motto on a license plate at the compulsion of the
government. 82 The Court again found the interests underlying the First
Amendment more compelling than the state’s purported interests in the
restriction. 83 Particularly, the Court noted, “where the State’s interest is to
disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest
cannot outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming
the courier for such message.” 84 The Court rejected the State’s asserted
interest in efficiency and compliance as insufficient to “stifle fundamental
personal liberties.” 85
77. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) (“Criticism of their official conduct
does not lose its constitutional protection merely because it is effective criticism and hence
diminishes their official reputations.”).
78. Id. at 273–74, 276 (“That statute made it a crime, punishable by a $5,000 fine and five
years in prison, ‘if any person shall write, print, utter or publish . . . any false, scandalous and
malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States . . . with intent to
defame . . . or to bring them . . . into contempt or disrepute.”). The Court provided examples
supporting the conclusion that the Sedition Act was not valid, despite never being challenged in the
Court, nothing that those convicted under the act were pardoned, fines were repaid by Congress
because they were unconstitutional, a senate report noted the invalidity of the Act, and repeatedly
assumed invalid by the Court. Id. at 276
79. Id.
80. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630–31 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (noting that
the constitutionality of the Sedition Act of 1798 has since been rejected, indicated by repaying
fines); see also 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS OF 1798, 553–554 (2d ed., 1836)
(“[T]he General Assembly doth particularly PROTEST against the palpable and alarming
infractions of the Constitution, in the two late cases of the ‘Alien and Sedition Acts,’ . . . and . . .
[the other provision] exercises . . . a power not delegated by the constitution, but on the contrary,
expressly and positively forbidden by one of the amendments thereto; a power, which more than
any other ought to produce universal alarm, because it is levelled against the right of freely
examining public characters and measures, and of free communication among people thereon,
which has ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every other right.”).
81. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
82. Id. at 717 (“We conclude that the State . . . may not require appellees to display the state
motto upon their license plates . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
83. Id. at 717.
84. Id. (footnote omitted).
85. Id. at 716.
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More recently, the Court in Houston v. Hill 86 opined on the
constitutionality of an ordinance that criminalized the act of interrupting a
police officer performing their duties. 87 In concluding that the ordinance was
overly broad, the Court stated that “the First Amendment protects a
significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police
officers.” 88 The Court affirmed the importance of provocative and
challenging speech, so long as it does not evoke a clear and present danger. 89
The Court’s protection of First Amendment interests has withstood
many challenged interests, expressing superiority over verbal attacks of
government officials, 90 criticism of government during war time under the
auspices of national security, 91 both practical ease of regulation and
promoting a state ideology, 92 and verbal interference with police. 93 The
Court’s only meaningful restriction on free speech is on speech that
advocates for the use of force only when that advocacy is both directed at and
likely to cause that force to occur. 94
The Fourth Circuit has also opined on balancing First Amendment
interests when individuals choose to waive their First Amendment rights. 95
Waivers of constitutional rights are not always enforceable, and, as with the
cases discussed above, the analysis requires balancing interests. 96 The Fourth
Circuit adopts common law contract principles to determine whether waivers
of constitutional rights are enforceable, but the analysis requires a higher
level of scrutiny “because the law does not presume the waiver of

86. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
87. Id. at 453. The specific speech act at issue was an individual shouting at a police officer
making an arrest. Id. at 453–54.
88. Id. at 461.
89. Id. (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)); see Lewis v. City of New
Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133–134 (1974) (“[T]he transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing ‘attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be
regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity’ . . . This is deemed necessary
because persons whose expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising
their rights for fear of criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected
expression.” (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520–21 (1972)).
90. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text.
94. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). The Court does not prohibit speech
that advocates the use of force, but merely the type of force that meets the requirements put forth in
the statute. Id. at 448. Otherwise the restriction would condemn speech “which our Constitution
has immunized from governmental control.” Id.
95. See infra notes 96–100 and accompanying text.
96. Lake James Cmty. Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Burke Cty., 149 F.3d 277, 280 (4th Cir.
1998).
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constitutional rights.” 97 Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the Fourth
Circuit reasoned that in order to enforce waivers of constitutional rights, a
waiver must be knowing, voluntary, and “not undermine the relevant public
interest.” 98 The Fourth Circuit in Pee Dee Health Care, P.A. v. Sanford 99
held that a constitutional waiver clause is unenforceable “if the interest in its
enforcement is outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy harmed
by enforcement of the agreement.” 100
The protection of the First Amendment has withstood challenges from
many competing interests, and even when an individual chooses to waive
their constitutional right, the enforcement is still subject to a heightened
analysis to determine if the interest is sufficient to justify overcoming a
constitutional right. 101
C. First Amendment and Individual Autonomy
The Supreme Court’s discussions about policies underlying the First
Amendment are restricted to specific cases or controversies.102 It has at times
elaborated on how freedom of speech is linked to individual autonomy and
the separation of individual speech from the government. 103 While the Court
in Abrams v. United States upheld the Espionage Act’s prohibition on
government-critical speech, it is Justice Holmes’ dissent that laid a crucial
foundation for the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. 104 In his dissent,
Justice Holmes identified the marketplace of ideas concept, stating:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test
of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the
theory of our Constitution. 105
97. Id.; see Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Com., 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937) (“We do not
presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.”).
98. Lake James Cmty. Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 149 F.3d at 280.
99. Pee Dee Health Care, P.A. v. Sanford, 509 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2007).
100. Pee Dee Health Care, P.A., 509 F.3d at 212 (quoting Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386,
392 (1987)).
101. See supra notes 69–100 and accompanying text.
102. See Doremus v. Bd. of Ed., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952) (“But, because our own jurisdiction
is cast in terms of ‘case or controversy,’ we cannot accept as the basis for review, nor as the basis
for conclusive disposition of an issue of federal law without review, any procedure which does not
constitute such.”).
103. See infra notes 107–114 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 105–106 and accompanying text.
105. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Holmes’ marketplace of ideas continues to provide an important
consideration in more recent First Amendment decisions. 106
In 1949, the Court in Terminiello v. Chicago 107 addressed the
importance of protecting freedom of speech and stated that “[t]he vitality of
civil and political institutions in our society depends on free discussion” and
that our freedom of speech separates us from “totalitarian regimes.” 108
Censoring speech absent a clear and present danger would “lead to the
standardization of ideas either by the legislatures, courts, or dominant
political or community groups.” 109
The Court similarly discussed the importance of the First Amendment
for individual autonomy in Virginia v. Hicks. 110 In Hicks, the Court analyzed
the enforceability of a no-trespassing policy. 111 In its opinion, the Court
noted a concern for the burden that individuals may face in attempts to assert
their freedom of speech when challenged by the government. 112 The burden
to challenge speech restrictions not only harms the person whose rights have
been violated, but also “society as a whole, which is deprived of an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas.” 113 The Court’s opinion emphasized the
risk posed by state restrictions on the First Amendment—that restrictions
disproportionately affect individuals who are unable to take on the
“considerable burden (and . . . risk)” to challenge the infringement. 114 These
examples illustrate the Court’s concern about the marketplace of ideas,
individual autonomy, and how the First Amendment protects against
silencing voices at the behest of the government. 115

106. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (discussing
the “integrity of the marketplace of political ideas”); Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003)
(discussing society’s need for an “uninhibited marketplace of ideas”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (discussing the necessity of “unfettered interchange of ideas”).
107. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
108. Id. at 4. The Court noted that the First Amendment should only be restricted when balanced
against a clear and present danger that extends beyond dispute, unrest, or inconvenience. Id.
(citation omitted). Terminiello concerned a man leading a meeting charged with breach of the peace
because he harshly criticized outside protesters, leading to disturbances that police could not control.
Id. at 3.
109. Id. at 4–5.
110. 539 U.S. 113 (2003).
111. Id. at 115–16. The trespassing policy a particular housing development for low-income
residents that implemented an ordinance that closed the streets to public to address “rampant crime
and drug dealing” and allowed police to “serve notice” to any person in violation who could not
demonstrate a “legitimate business or social purpose.” Id. (emphasis excluded). Hicks, having been
convicted of trespass, challenged the ordinance as “unconstitutionally overbroad and void for
vagueness.” Id. at 117.
112. Id. at 119.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See supra notes 103–114 and accompanying text.
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III. THE COURT’S REASONING
With Judge Floyd writing for the 2-1 majority, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the inclusion of a nondisparagement clause in a settlement agreement with a victim of police
brutality constituted a waiver of the victim’s First Amendment rights. 116 This
case arose on appeal of the district court’s grant of summary judgment for
the City. 117 The court reasoned that the public interest in protecting
Overbey’s First Amendment rights outweighed the City’s countervailing
interests. 118 Therefore, the agreement to waive her First Amendment rights
was void. 119
The court first concluded that the settlement agreement, including a nondisparagement provision restricting Overbey’s communications with the
public, constituted a waiver of her First Amendment rights. 120 The court
rejected the City’s argument that the non-disparagement provision was
enforceable because Overbey was merely exercising her right not to speak
when she agreed to the settlement. 121 The court explained that the right not
to speak originated to prevent compulsion of individual speech by the
government. 122 In Overbey’s case, the non-disparagement clause “curb[ed]
her voluntary speech to meet the City’s specifications” which constituted a
waiver of her protections under the First Amendment. 123 The court
emphasized that there are compelling public interests contrary to the
agreement and rejected the City’s argument that this was an exercise of
Overbey’s right not to speak. 124
Having established that the non-disparagement clause waived
Overbey’s First Amendment rights, the court then evaluated the policy
interests in favor and opposed to enforceability of the settlement provision. 125
First, the court identified two strong public policy interests at the core of the
First Amendment that show the provision is contrary to public interest: (1)

116. Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930 F.3d 215, 222 (4th Cir. 2019).
117. Id. at 219.
118. Id. at 226.
119. Id. at 222.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 222–23.
122. Id. at 223.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. In assessing the enforceability of a waiver of Overbey’s First Amendment rights, the
Court looked to (1) whether she entered with contract knowingly and voluntarily and (2) whether
there were competing interests in favor of enforcing the waiver of her First Amendment rights that
were not overpowered by a “relevant public policy that would be harmed by enforcement” of the
waiver. Id. The court addressed only the second factor in this assessment because it was “decisive
as a matter of law.” Id.
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commitment to open debate on public issues and (2) individual speech about
mistrust of governmental power. 126 In assessing both of these interests, the
government’s use of the non-disparagement provision to curb Overbey’s
speech “was contrary to the citizenry’s First Amendment interest in limiting
the government’s ability to target and remove speech critical of the
government from public disclosure.” 127
The court then evaluated each interest asserted by the City in favor of
enforcing the waiver. 128 The City claimed a public interest in efficiency—to
settle cases quickly and not spend money on litigation. 129 The court reasoned
that efficiency is not a sufficiently compelling interest to overcome the
waiver of a constitutional right. 130 The City asserted further that the officers
had an interest in clearing their names of Overbey’s accusations and that the
City had an interest in avoiding harmful publicity. 131 The court rejected each
of these arguments by noting that protecting public officials from criticism is
not sufficiently compelling to override First Amendment rights, and further,
the non-disparagement clause does not serve the interest of allowing the
officers to clear their names. 132 Finally, the City argued that even if the court
found that the settlement constituted a waiver of her rights, the provision was
still enforceable because Overbey had the option to “buy [her rights] back”
by forfeiting half of the settlement. 133 The court rejected this argument,
stating that “[w]e have never ratified the government’s purchase of a
potential critic’s silence merely because it would be unfair to deprive the
government of the full value of its hush money.” 134 The court concluded by
finding that the City’s interests were not sufficient to justify enforcing a

126. Id. at 224.
127. Id. at 224–25.
128. Id. at 225–26.
129. Id. at 225.
130. Id. The court similarly responded to an argument by the City that Overbey merely
exercised her right not to speak in accepting the settlement terms. Id. The court again emphasized
that the right not to speak was intended to protect individual voices from compulsion of speech by
governments. Id.
131. Id. at 225–26.
132. Id. at 226 (“Enforcing a waiver of First Amendment rights for the very purpose of
insulating public officials from unpleasant attacks would plainly undermine that core First
Amendment principle.”).
133. Id. (citing Brief for Appellees at 39, Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930 F.3d 215 (4th
Cir. 2019) (No. 17-2444)).
134. Id. (“We are not eager to get into that business now.”).
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provision that waived Overbey’s First Amendment rights. 135 As such, the
court reversed and remanded the matter to the district court. 136
In his dissent, Judge Quattlebaum diverged from the majority’s
reasoning in favor of the City. 137 Judge Quattlebaum reasoned that, based on
the limited impairment of the public policy interests and the City’s
compelling interests, the non-disparagement provision should be upheld. 138
In assessing the impact of the non-disparagement clause, Judge Quattlebaum
relied predominantly on four factors: (1) the narrow impact of the restriction
on Overbey’s First Amendment rights, (2) Overbey’s ability to speak freely
should she forgo half of her settlement, (3) the public’s existing awareness of
the police misconduct and settlement, and (4) Overbey’s right not to speak. 139
Judge Quattlebaum then assessed the City’s interest in enforcing the
agreement and found them compelling. 140 Judge Quattlebaum stressed that
the finality and certainty of contracts are strong and compelling interests,
especially considering the City forwent an “opportunity for vindication by a
judge or jury” in favor of settlement. 141 Judge Quattlebaum concluded that
the majority erred in its balancing of the relevant policies and stated that the
district court’s dismissal ought to have been affirmed. 142
IV. ANALYSIS
In Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that Baltimore City’s use of non-disparagement
clauses in their settlements with victims of police brutality violated the
victims’ First Amendment right to free speech. 143 This Part argues first that
the case was correctly decided because the court’s reasoning was consistent
with the protective First Amendment jurisprudence. 144 This Part next argues
that the court’s holding affirms the importance of protecting speech that is
critical of the government. 145 The importance of protecting speech is further

135. Id. The court continued with an analysis of standing for the Baltimore Brew based on
“whether the Brew’s plausible allegations in the Amended Complaint, taken as true, are enough to
give the Brew constitutional standing.” Id. at 227. The court ultimately concluded that the Brew
plead sufficiently to meet the standing requirement. Id. at 230.
136. Id. at 230.
137. Id. (Quattlebaum, J., dissenting).
138. Id. Judge Quattlebaum began his dissent by noting that the freedom to contract is a
“bedrock principle[] of our country.” Id.
139. Id. at 232–33.
140. Id. at 233.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 234.
143. Id. at 226 (majority opinion).
144. See infra Section IV.A.
145. See infra Section IV.B.

2020]

OVERBEY V. MAYOR OF BALTIMORE

1137

supported by the various goals underlying the First Amendment—the goals
of truth, self-governance, and self-fulfillment. 146 Finally, this Part argues that
the court’s holding supports an important implication in application of
government-critical speech protections to victims of police brutality, most
often individuals in marginalized communities. 147 Therefore, the court’s
correct decision plays an important role in affirming the First Amendment
jurisprudence and its application to government efforts to silence specific
individuals, most often people of color, from sharing their experiences in
public discourse. 148
A. The Court Correctly Decided Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore in
Light of First Amendment Jurisprudence
In assessing whether the waiver of Overbey’s right to free speech was
enforceable, the court correctly balanced the interest in affirming Overbey’s
First Amendment right with the City’s asserted interest in enforcing the nondisparagement clause of the agreement. 149 This assessment addressed the
argument that Overbey voluntarily chose to waive her right to free speech
and therefore the court should not intervene. 150 Relying on Pee Dee Health
Care v. Sanford, the court showed that a waiver of Overbey’s free speech
right was only enforceable if the interest was not outweighed by a
countervailing public policy. 151 In analyzing the public policy interests, the
court correctly identified open debate and mistrust of the government as
important public policy interests underlying the importance of Overbey’s
First Amendment right to free speech. 152 The court relied on New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan in finding that there was a “profound” commitment to open
debate on public issues and Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission
to identify a strong interest in mistrust of government power. 153 Police

146. See infra Section IV.B.
147. See infra Section IV.C.
148. See infra Section IV.A–C.
149. Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930 F.3d 215, 226 (4th Cir. 2019).
150. Id. at 225. But see id. at 230 (Quattlebaum, J., dissenting) (“One of the bedrock principles
of our country is the freedom of parties, public and private, to enter into agreements without fear
that courts will re-write them if one side has a change of heart.”).
151. Id. at 223; see also Pee Dee Health Care, P.A. v. Sanford, 509 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir.
2007).
152. Overbey, 930 F.3d at 224; see supra Section II.A–B.
153. Overbey, 930 F.3d at 223; see N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270–71 (1964)
(“Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials. The present advertisement, as an expression of grievance and protest on one of the major
public issues of our time, would seem clearly to qualify for the constitutional protection.” (citations
omitted)); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010). The court
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brutality, at issue in Overbey, is a public policy issue that should be subject
to open debate, as discussed in New York Times Co. 154 The current social
consciousness around police use of force, particularly against Black
individuals in Baltimore City, leaves little doubt that experiences of police
brutality raise important public issues, and the government seeks to minimize
critiques by compelling silence from victims of police brutality. 155
In its defense, the City asserted three interests—efficiency, the
opportunity for officers to clear their names, and curtailment of harmful
publicity. 156 According to the both the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit,
none of these concerns are sufficiently compelling to overcome Overbey’s
individual interest in free speech or society’s interest in the free exchange of
ideas. 157 The Court in Wooley v. Maynard explicitly rejected that state
administration and efficiency is a compelling public policy. 158 Further, New
York Times Co. and the Court’s critique of the Sedition Act shows that attacks
on government officials and the concern of government attacks raising
national security issues are not sufficient to curtail speech. 159 If national
security and public condemnation of public officials based on false
information are not sufficiently compelling to impose a restriction on
government-critical speech, then concern about harmful publicity is hardly
enough. 160
The Court has described the outer limits of the First Amendment and
the greatest restriction, per Brandenburg v. Ohio, is action that is directed
toward effectuating imminent lawless action. 161 Absent such a compelling
policy, the state may not restrict a person’s right to free speech, especially

also affirmed the importance of protecting speech regardless of content, as seen in Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Board and Police Department of
Chicago v. Mosley. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105 (1991); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
154. See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270.
155. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY
POLICE DEPARTMENT 1, 3 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download. The U.S.
Department of Justice investigated the Baltimore City Police Department and found a pattern of
“(1) making unconstitutional stops, searches, and arrests; (2) using enforcement strategies that
produce severe and unjustified disparities in the rates of stops, searches and arrests of African
Americans; (3) using excessive force; and (4) retaliating against people engaged in constitutionallyprotected expression.” Id.
156. Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930 F.3d 215, 225–26. (4th Cir. 2019).
157. Id.; see supra Section II.B.
158. 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977).
159. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274–76 (1964). In New York Times Co., the
information shared criticizing the government official was found to be factually false, and it was
still not sufficient to restrict the speech. Id. at 258.
160. See id. at 273–76.
161. 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969).
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when that person is speaking critically about the government. 162 Therefore,
because of the important interests underlying Overbey’s First Amendment
rights and the lack of compelling state interests, the restriction of Overbey’s
speech was an unconstitutional restriction of her First Amendment free
speech right. 163
B. The Court’s Holding Affirmed the Importance of GovernmentCritical Speech Protections Consistent with Policies Underlying the
First Amendment
The importance of protecting speech that criticizes the government is
one of the foundations of democracy—without it, the government would be
a “totalitarian regime.” 164 The Supreme Court in New York Times Co.,
Citizens United, and Houston v. Hill emphasized the importance of protecting
government critique and verbal attacks of government officials. 165 In
Houston, the Court restricted the ability of the state to punish a party for
verbally interfering with police. 166 The Court reasoned that “[t]he freedom
of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action . . . is one of the
principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police
state.” 167 The Court’s jurisprudence illustrates that the government cannot
dictate belief and speech, nor are the government’s interest entitled to greater
weight than individual speech. 168
The importance of protecting government-critical speech is also
emphasized by multiple foundational theories of the First Amendment. 169

162. Id.
163. See supra notes 149–162 and accompanying text.
164. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (“Speech is often provocative and
challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as
it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute . . . is
nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment . . . .” (citation omitted)).
165. See Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987) (addressing the state’s inability to limit
critical speech in an engagement with police); supra notes 152–160 and accompanying text.
166. Houston, 482 U.S. at 461.
167. Id. at 462–63.
168. See supra 164–167 and accompanying text; see also Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930
F.3d 215, 225–26. (4th Cir. 2019).
169. See Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1015, 1016–
17 (2015) (“Three competing free speech theories dominate U.S. judicial and scholarly discourse.
Proponents of the first theory claim that the purpose of protecting free speech is to further
democratic institutions. Those of the second school conceive the constitutional commitment to
personal autonomy to be the reason why courts and society at large diligently safeguard and
treasure free speech. And those of the third persuasion connect the high regard for free speech to
the advancement of knowledge. All three of these approaches recognize that careful judicial
scrutiny of speech regulations is essential to prevent government intrusions into private and political
lives . . . . The Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its application, and, indeed, has never
definitively adopted one over the others.” (footnotes omitted)).
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While the Court has never explicitly adopted a single theory underlying the
First Amendment, it has utilized a number of different theories at the core of
the First Amendment in its reasoning. 170 Three theoretical foundations
underlying the First Amendment are (1) the search for truth, (2) the goal of
self-governance, and (3) the goal of self-fulfillment and personal
autonomy. 171
First, the theory that free speech is essential in the search for truth is
often referred to as the “marketplace of ideas.”172 The marketplace of ideas
theory is rooted in the ideology of John Stuart Mill. 173 In Mill’s text, On
Liberty, he noted:
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that
it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing
generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than
those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the
opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what
is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier
impression of truth, produced by its collision with error. 174
Mill’s theory states that truth will be discovered when society has access to
all opinions on the matter.175 Mill’s theory also addresses concerns about
when those opinions are silenced, noting that authorities that deny the truth
of statements are not infallible and do not have the authority to decide truth
for the whole community. 176 Silencing opinions is an act of power, according
to Mill and the marketplace of ideas. 177

170. Id.
171. GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1014–15, 1017 (8th ed. 2018); see
also Tsesis, supra note 169, at 1017 (“My claim is that First Amendment doctrine should reflect a
general theory of constitutional law that protects individual liberty and the common good to open
society.”).
172. STONE ET AL., supra note 171, at 1014.
173. Id.
174. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 14 (Kathy Casey ed., Dover Thrift Edition 2002) (1859).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 14–15 (“[T]he opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may possibly
be true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny its truth; but they are not infallible. They
have no authority to decide the question for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the
means of judging. To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to
assume that their certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion is an
assumption of infallibility.”).
177. Id. The marketplace of ideas as a search for truth was introduced to the Court’s
jurisprudence through Justice Holmes’ dissent in Abrams v. United States, with Holmes stating that
the “best test of truth is the power of thought to get . . . accepted in the competition of the market.”
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The importance of free speech as it relates to
ideas and the function of democracy was again echoed by the Court in Terminiello v. Chicago and
its prohibition against silence “provocative” or “challenging” speech. 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (“The
right to speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief
distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.”); see also Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
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The court’s decision in Overbey is consistent with the search for truth.178
The City’s practice of requiring non-disparagement provisions in their
settlement agreements applies regularly to Baltimore City Police brutality
settlements. 179 Under a theory of the marketplace of ideas, the City’s
restriction of Overbey’s speech (and the speech of others like her) prohibited
her from offering a different opinion in a community conversation. 180 With
her speech, Overbey offered her experience to promote truth. 181 To
“attempt[] to suppress” her speech is to “deprive[] . . . the opportunity of
exchanging error for truth.” 182 In upholding Overbey’s First Amendment
speech right, the court supported the search for truth by allowing Overbey to
share her experience in the marketplace of ideas. 183
Second, the court’s decision is also consistent with underlying theory of
the First Amendment that free speech is crucial to self-governance. 184
Alexander Meiklejohn promoted this idea in his book Free Speech and Its
Relation to Self-Government. 185 He stated, “[Citizens] may not be barred
[from speaking] because their views are thought to be false or dangerous . . .
when men govern themselves, it is they—and no one else—who must pass
judgment on the unwisdom and unfairness and danger.” 186 Speech cannot be
restricted because it is crucial to the function of a democracy. 187 This
554 U.S. 724, 755–56 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[I]t is the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail . . . .” (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co, v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969))).
178. See infra notes 179–183 and accompanying text.
179. Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930 F.3d 215, 220 (4th Cir. 2019).
180. See id.; Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4 (“The vitality of civil and political institutions in our
society depends on free discussion . . . [I]t is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas
that government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected.”
(citation omitted)). Overbey responded to internet commenters that accused her of lying to coerce
a settlement from the Baltimore City Police Department. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 9.
The sentiment that she was to blame for the police officers’ use of violence resulted in part from the
City Solicitor describing her as “hostile” and noting that she had to be “Tased in order to calm
down” when discussing her settlement. Broadwater, supra note 26; see also Overbey, 930 F.3d at
220.
181. See MILL, supra note 174, at 14 (“If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the
opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the
clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.”).
182. Id.
183. See supra notes 172–182 and accompanying text.
184. STONE ET AL., supra note 171, at 1015.
185. Id. at 1016 (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT 15–16, 24–27, 39 (1948)).
186. Id.
187. Id.; see Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV.
245, 255 (1961) (“We, the people who govern, must try to understand the issues which, incident by
incident, face the nation. We must pass judgment upon the decisions which our agents make upon
those issues. And, further, we must share in devising methods by which those decisions can be
made wise and effective or, if need be, supplanted by others which promise greater wisdom and
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philosophy was presented in Terminiello v. Chicago, which warned of a
totalitarian regime should the court allow speech to be silenced. 188 The State
should not be allowed to dictate ideology by silencing voices. 189
The Fourth Circuit’s decision to not allow the waiver of Overbey’s free
speech rights promotes the goal of self-governance in a functioning
democracy. 190 Specifically, the court’s protection of criticism of a
government actor is crucial. 191 Through the use of the non-disparagement
clause, the City prohibited an experience from being shared with the
public. 192 Overbey’s experience was one of government agents beating her
for no reason (other than arguably her race and gender) 193 and represents a
major political issue both nationally and within Baltimore City in
particular. 194 To deny that content from reaching the public, by silencing an
individual’s voice, is contrary to the goal of self-governance. 195 It bars
Overbey, or anyone who experiences police brutality, from bringing truth to
the public on a major social and political issue. 196
Third, the court’s decision strongly upholds the theory that the First
Amendment is necessary for self-fulfillment and personal autonomy. 197
Personal autonomy refers to an individual’s capacity to “pursue successfully
the life she endorses.” 198 One scholar noted that autonomy requires that a
person has the right to make decisions about themselves through selfeffectiveness. Now it is these activities, in all their diversity, whose freedom fills up ‘the scope of
the First Amendment.’ These are the activities to whose freedom it gives its unqualified protection.
And it must be recognized that the literal text of the Amendment falls far short of expressing the
intent and the scope of that protection.”).
188. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
189. Id.
190. See Meiklejohn, supra note 187, at 255 (“The First Amendment does not protect a ‘freedom
to speak.’ It protects the freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which we
‘govern.’ It is concerned, not with a private right, but with a public power, a governmental
responsibility.”).
191. Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930 F.3d 215, 226 (4th Cir. 2019) (“Enforcing a waiver
of First Amendment rights for the very purpose of insulating public officials from unpleasant attacks
would plainly undermine that core First Amendment principle.”).
192. Id. at 220.
193. See id. (“Ashley Overbey sued three officers of Baltimore Police Department (BPD),
alleging that the officers had beaten, tased, verbally abused, and needlessly arrested her in her own
home after she called 911 to report a burglary.”).
194. Id. See generally David A. Graham, The Horror of the Baltimore Police Department,
ATLANTIC (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/08/the-horror-of-thebaltimore-police-department/495329/; Jenavieve Hatch, How 2020 Contenders Are Approaching
Police Brutality and Criminal Justice Reform, HUFFINGTON POST (Jun. 22, 2019),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/2020-democrats-police-brutality_n_5d0d079ae4b07ae90d9c99d5.
195. STONE ET AL., supra note 171, at 1016 (citing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 15–16, 24–27, 39 (1948)).
196. Id.; see Overbey, 930 F.3d at 220.
197. STONE ET AL., supra note 172, at 1017.
198. C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 253 (2011).

2020]

OVERBEY V. MAYOR OF BALTIMORE

1143

expression, like a right to “persuade or unite or associate with others—or to
offend . . . them.” 199 The notion of personal autonomy and self-fulfillment is
inextricably linked to notions of self-respect. 200
Further expanding on why First Amendment free speech is crucial to
self-fulfillment, David A. J. Richards notes:
The idea here is that people are not to be constrained to
communicate or not to communicate, to believe or not to believe,
to associate or not to associate. The value placed on this cluster of
ideas derives from the notion of self-respect that comes from a
mature person’s full and untrammeled exercise of capacities
central to human rationality. Thus, the significance of free
expression rests on the central human capacity to create and
express symbolic systems, such as speech . . . intended to
communicate in determinate, complex and subtle ways. Freedom
of expression permits and encourages the exercise of these
capacities: it supports a mature individual’s sovereign autonomy in
deciding how to communicate with others. . . . In so doing, it
nurtures and sustains the self-respect of the mature person. 201
To restrict liberties would be to deny someone the ability to nurture their
basic sense of self and the autonomy and integrity of their personhood. 202
A number of the Supreme Court’s opinions have echoed the notion that
free speech is crucial to self-fulfillment. 203 In Terminiello, the Court was
concerned that restricting freedom of speech would lead to a standardization
of ideas where dominant political or community groups dictate truth and
opinion. 204 Similarly, in Virginia v. Hicks, the Court emphasized that speech
restrictions are dangerous because many people would not “undertake the
considerable burden” to challenge the restriction and would instead just
choose silence. 205 Finally, in Citizens United, the Court also emphasized
concern about efforts to silence and disadvantage specific voices. 206 The
Court noted that “[b]y taking the right to speak from some and giving it to

199. Id. at 254 (“In the formal conception, autonomy consists of a person’s authority (or right)
to make decisions about herself—her own meaningful actions and usually her use of her resources—
as long as her actions do not block others’ similar authority or rights. This formal autonomy in
relation to one’s self does not include any right to exercise power over others. It does, however,
encompass self-expressive rights that include, for example, a right to seek to persuade or unite or
associate with others—or to offend, expose, condemn, or disassociate with them.”).
200. David A. J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the
First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See infra notes 204–214 and accompanying text.
204. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949).
205. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003).
206. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
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others, the Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the
right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the
speakers voice.” 207
The notion of self-respect is also consistent with the court’s rejection of
the City’s argument that Overbey was exercising her right not to speak. 208
The right not to speak is rooted in protection from government compulsion
of speech, as the court noted, and therefore is not applicable when the
government entices an individual to silence.209 Here, the City’s offered
“option” to not speak did not protect Overbey from government pressure to
speak something she did not believe. 210 Instead, the City sought to compel
Overbey’s silence to limit her critique of the City itself, the exact concern
raised in Citizens United. 211 By maintaining Overbey’s right to free speech,
the Court rooted its concern for her First Amendment right in the societal
interest in “individual freedom of mind.” 212
Beyond the importance of freedom of speech in the functioning of
democracy, the court’s reasoning also emphasized a danger posed by the use
of non-disparagement clauses in police brutality statements. 213 The danger
alluded to by the court is the danger that arises from governments using their
power to limit critiques by silencing individuals. 214
C. The Court’s Opinion Affirmed the Importance of GovernmentCritical Speech Protections for Individuals from Marginalized
Communities
The court’s emphasis on protecting government-critical speech and the
emphasis on principles of personal autonomy and self-fulfillment underlying
the First Amendment have major implications on speech protections for
members of marginalized communities. 215 The court’s decision comes while
the United States is in the midst of a social movement to address systematic

207. Id. at 340–341 (noting that “the Government may commit a constitutional wrong when by
law it identifies certain preferred speakers”).
208. Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930 F.3d 215, 222–23 (4th Cir. 2019)
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340–41.
212. Overbey, 930 F.3d at 225.
213. See Richards, supra note 200, at 60 (stating that the moral theory underlying the First
Amendment includes “[t]he central intuitive features of morality are mutual respect—treating others
as you would like to be treated in comparable circumstances; universalization—judging the morality
of principles by the consequences of their universal application; and minimization of fortuitous
human differences, like clan, caste, ethnicity, and color, as a basis for differential treatment.”
(footnotes omitted)).
214. See id.
215. See id.
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racism and police brutality against Black individuals.216 While these issues
were not collectively before the court as it decided Overbey, its reasoning
will hold important implications as it relates to free speech and identity. 217
As asserted in the previous section, the goal of individual autonomy underlies
freedom of speech protections, yet non-disparagement agreements in police
brutality settlements impede on individual autonomy. 218 The nondisparagement clauses for police brutality interfere with individual autonomy
in two significant ways: They (1) like in sexual harassment settlements,
prevent individuals from sharing experiences and (2) disproportionately
impact historically underprivileged populations and minimize their
autonomy when at odds with government power. 219
First, government speech restrictions are at odds with the First
Amendment’s goal of self-fulfillment and personal autonomy because they
silence someone from sharing negative experiences when their rights have
been violated. 220 Free speech should not be constrained by whether it is to
be believed or associated with, because “the notion of self-respect that comes
from a mature person’s full and untrammeled exercise of capacities” is
“central to human rationality.” 221 Non-disclosure agreements in sexual
harassment settlements present a parallel to their use in police brutality
settlements. 222 While different in scope, non-disparagement clauses have
been recently criticized in the context of sexual harassment. 223 Similar to the
216. See Niraj Chokshi, How #BlackLivesMatter Came to Define a Movement, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/23/us/how-blacklivesmatter-came-to-define-amovement.html (“The hashtag had a small, but sustained increase in use in the summer of 2014,
when Michael Brown and Eric Garner died in encounters with the police, focusing a national
discussion on race and policing and elevating a phrase that would define a movement.”).
217. See infra notes 218–262 and accompanying text.
218. Richards, supra note 200, at 60, 62.
219. See infra notes 239–262 and accompanying text.
220. See Richards, supra note 200, at 62 (“Freedom of expression . . . supports a mature
individual’s sovereign autonomy in deciding how to communicate with others . . . [and] disfavors
restrictions on communication imposed for the sake of the distortion rigidities of the orthodox and
the established.”).
221. Id.; see Baker, supra note 198, at 254 (stating that autonomy encompasses the right to “seek
to persuade or united or associate with other—or to offend, expose, condemn, or disassociate with
them”).
222. See Hoffman & Lampmann, Hushing Contracts, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 165, 167–68 (2019)
(discussing the impact of the #MeToo movement on “hush contracts”). Notably, concern over hush
contracts in sexual harassment contexts may also be impacted by the court’s reasoning in Overbey
because of the City’s use of non-disparagement agreements in sexual harassment settlements.
Forced Silence Condones Police Violence, ACLU MD. (accessed Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.aclumd.org/en/campaigns/forced-silence-condones-police-violence (“This is a systemic problem in
Baltimore City that deeply harms women and communities of color.”).
223. See, e.g., Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 222, at 169 (“After collecting information
from a variety of sources and disciplines, we argue that not only do hush contracts encourage
specific acts of repeated (and spiraling) misconduct, but also they can corrupt entire organizations
and communities.”(footnotes omitted)); Vasundhara Prasad, If Anyone Is Listening, #MeToo:

1146

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:1122

current public discourse around police brutality, the country is also in the
midst of the #MeToo social movement. 224 The #MeToo movement has raised
awareness about the different types of sexual violence, including sexual
harassment, that (predominantly) women experience. 225 #MeToo has come
up significantly in employment cases where women claim they have been
sexually harassed by their usually male employers. 226 A number of scholars
have raised concerns about the use of non-disparagement clauses in
settlements for sexual harassment. 227 For instance, one scholar identified
that, while non-disparagement clauses may have beneficial purposes, they
can be “incredibly pernicious contracts” in the context of sexual violence. 228
In the context of sexual violence, these contracts require oversight because
they raise considerable public policy concerns over the freedom of speech
and “the public’s interest in knowing about these repeat sexual offenders.” 229
These “contracts of silence” are concerning when used to silence individuals
from sharing their experiences. 230 Another scholar noted that, given the
current social moment, “[p]ublic disclosures of contractual secrets are giving
breach a good name.” 231
A number of states have proposed legislation to protect individuals
impacted by sexual harassment who must choose between settlement and
sharing their experiences. 232 A New York bill prohibited non-disclosure
agreements in sexual harassment settlements unless it was the complainant’s
preference. 233 A California bill made it unlawful for employers to use nondisclosure clauses in sexual harassment settlements. 234 Concerns about
silencing contracts reflect the existing concern that someone with great power
may demand silence and force an individual with less power to choose

Breaking the Culture of Silence Around Sexual Abuse Through Regulating Non-Disclosure
Agreements and Secret Settlements, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2507, 2509 (2018) (“[B]ecause the most
egregious offenders of sexual assault and sexual harassment prohibit victims from speaking out
through the brazen use of NDAs, courts should take a heightened role in determining whether such
agreements are enforceable as a matter of law.”).
224. See, e.g., Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 222, at 167–68; Prasad, supra note 223, at
2508–09.
225. Prasad, supra note 223, at 2510–11.
226. Id.
227. See infra note 228–231 and accompanying text.
228. Prasad, supra note 223, at 2508.
229. Id. at 2508–09.
230. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
231. Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 222, at 167.
232. Id. at 168, 188.
233. Id. at 168.
234. Id. at 188.
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between silence and speech. 235 For this reason, the concern over silence in
sexual harassment settlements should extend to the settlements over police
brutality. 236 Police brutality settlements are arguably even more concerning
because the entity silencing speech is the government itself. 237 The
government eliminates criticism from the community and limits an
individual’s opportunity for self-fulfillment. 238
Second, the City’s use of non-disparagement clauses in settlements for
police brutality, as indicated by the court’s reasoning, will further silence and
deny self-fulfillment to members of marginalized communities.239 Concerns
about personal autonomy and silencing speech are supported by the
disproportionate impact of police use of force on minorities and the struggle
of marginalized individuals to assert their rights. 240 Research shows that
police misconduct disproportionately impacts Black community members. 241
Black individuals are overpoliced, more likely to experience force from
police, and more likely to be killed by police. 242 A 2015 survey found that
unarmed Black individuals were more than two times as likely as white
individuals to be killed by police. 243 Beyond killings, Black individuals are

235. See Prasad, supra note 223, at 2510 (noting the “public scrutiny over the widespread use
of NDAs by individuals in positions of power to silence the victims they have sexually abused or
sexually harassed” (footnote omitted)).
236. See id.
237. See Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930 F.3d 215, 224 (4th Cir. 2019) (noting that speech
protection is warranted here “because the non-disparagement clause is a government-defined and
government-enforced restriction on government-critical speech”).
238. Richards, supra note 200, at 62.
239. See Richards, supra note 200, at 60 (“The central intuitive features of morality are mutual
respect treating others as you would like to be treated in comparable circumstances; universalization
judging the morality of principles by the consequences of their universal application; and
minimization of fortuitous human differences, like clan, caste, ethnicity, and color, as a basis for
differential treatment.” (footnotes omitted)).
240. See infra notes 241–251 and accompanying text.
241. See generally Radley Balko, There’s Overwhelming Evidence That the Criminal-Justice
POST
(Sept.
18,
2018),
System
is
Racist.
Here’s
the
Proof,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/09/18/theres-overwhelming-evidencethat-the-criminal-justice-system-is-racist-heres-the-proof/.
242. See id. (compiling research on the ways Black individuals are more often impacted by
policing and profiling); ELIZABETH DAVIS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONTACTS BETWEEN
POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2015, at 1, 17 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp15.pdf
(finding that Black individuals were more likely to experiences use of force than white individuals);
Frank Edwards et al., Risk of Being Killed by Police Use of Force in the United States by Age, RaceEthnicity, and Sex, 116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A., 16793, 16794 (2019) (finding that Black
men and boys had the highest rates of being killed by police).
243. Jon Swaine et al., Black Americans Killed by Police Twice as Likely to Be Unarmed as
(June
1,
2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/usWhite
People,
GUARDIAN
news/2015/jun/01/black-americans-killed-by-police-analysis (finding that that thirty-two percent of
Black people were unarmed when killed by police, making them two times more likely to be
unarmed than white people).
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more likely to experience the threat or use of physical force by police than
white individuals, with the majority perceiving the threat or use of force to
be excessive. 244 Individuals experiencing excessive police force described
being pushed, grabbed, kicked, and targeted with a gun. 245
When police impose speech restrictions on Black individuals who have
been subject to this brutality, their voices are silenced.246 Black experiences
are eliminated from public discourse. 247 As Richards noted on selffulfillment, “people are not to be constrained to communicate or not to
communicate” and self-respect is only achieved with “a mature person’s full
and untrammeled exercise of capacities central to human rationality.” 248
Society requires basic opportunities and an equal distribution of rights
for all individuals to fully embrace the liberties linked with personal
autonomy and self-respect. 249 Therefore, when speech is restricted in a way
that disproportionately impacts individuals who have been denied equal
rights in other respects, there is even greater concern about the impact on
personal autonomy. 250 Use of non-disparagement clauses by police to
prevent Black community members from sharing the ways their rights have
been violated continues to subjugate these community members and deny
them the opportunity for self-fulfillment through representation in the
political and societal discourse. 251
The concern over non-disparagement clauses in police settlements and
their impact on marginalized communities is further exacerbated by the
problem noted by the Court in Hicks. 252 In Hicks, the Court emphasized the
burden in attempting to assert one’s rights can be substantial. 253 There is an
even greater burden for marginalized individuals.254 Non-disparagement
clauses make it even harder for marginalized individuals to share their
experiences. 255 Individuals who have the least power to challenge
244. Davis et al., supra note 242, at 17.
245. Id. at 16.
246. See Garfield, supra note 4, at 264 (noting with concern that “[c]ontracts of silence are being
used effectively to keep relevant and possibly important information out of the public domain”).
247. Id.
248. Richards, supra note 200, at 62.
249. Id. at 63.
250. See id. at 62 (“The value placed on this cluster of ideas derives from the notion of selfrespect that comes from a mature person’s full and untrammeled exercise of capacities central to
human rationality.”).
251. See id.
252. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.; see also Risk of Being Killed by Police Use of Force in the United States, supra note
243 (“Baltimore City officials require victims of police brutality to sign ‘gag orders’ banning them
from telling their own stories in order to resolve their cases.”).
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restrictions to their free speech are those most unable to take on the
“considerable burden” when their rights are challenged. 256 This burdening
problem was plainly evidenced by Overbey’s own experience of being
physical violated and charged with committing a crime. 257 Afterwards, she
was unable to find a job because of the criminal charge on her record and
became homeless. 258 When the City made its settlement offer, Overbey was
in a position of having to settle on their terms or face an even greater burden
to challenge the terms. 259 With Black community members more likely to
experience police violence, they are then subject to an ongoing cycle that
requires they meet a heavy burden to assert rights. 260 For that reason, they
may choose not to assert their rights or choose to settle and waive their rights
out of necessity. 261 But, in the process, the City deprives its community
members of self-fulfillment and autonomy. 262
The court’s decision addressed this impact on self-fulfillment. 263 In its
reasoning, the court shows that personal autonomy and free speech are more
important than the government’s interest in protecting itself from criticism. 264
Thus, while the case was rightly decided according to Supreme Court
precedent, the relevance of this opinion extends far beyond a correct
holding. 265 The Overbey opinion highlights that the First Amendment
operates as a safeguard when the government attempts to use its power to
silence marginalized populations who choose to share their negative
experiences with the government publicly. 266
V. CONCLUSION
In Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, the Fourth Circuit held that the City
of Baltimore could not enforce non-disparagement clauses in settlements for
256. Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119.
257. See Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930 F.3d 215, 220 (4th Cir. 2019) (noting that
Overbey was “needlessly” charged with a crime, spent two years trying to have her case remedied,
struggled to find work with the arrest record, and “she and her children became homeless”).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See supra note 255–256 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
262. Richards, supra note 200, at 62.
263. Overbey, 930 F.3d at 224 (“Indeed, when the government (1) makes a police-misconduct
claimant’s silence about her claims a condition of settlement; (2) obtains the claimant’s promise of
silence; (3) retains for itself the unilateral ability to determine whether the claimant has broken her
promise; and (4) enforces the claimant’s promise by, in essence, holding her civilly liable to itself,
there can be no serious doubt that the government has used its power in an effort to curb speech that
is not to its liking.”).
264. See id.
265. See supra notes 197–264 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 197–264 and accompanying text.
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police brutality. 267 The court correctly analyzed the balance of First
Amendment interests underlying free speech with the City’s asserted
interests in favor of enforcing the agreement. 268 The court relied on
commitments to open debate on public issues and mistrust of government as
significantly protected interests within the First Amendment. 269 The interests
in freedom of speech have long prevailed over other asserted interests. 270 The
court’s decision was also consistent with the theoretical foundations of the
First Amendment—the goals of truth, self-governance, and selffulfillment. 271 In particular, the goals of self-fulfillment and personal
autonomy were served when the court refused to enforce a settlement to
purchase silence from a victim of police brutality. 272 By using nondisparagement clauses in police brutality settlements, cases most often
impacting marginalized community members, the City is effectively
silencing its own critics and denying their humanity in the process. 273 The
court’s decision to reject this practice sends a clear message: Governments
cannot silence an individual’s experience to save its own reputation. 274

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Overbey, 930 F.3d at 226.
See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Section IV.A.
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